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What explains preferential voting? A field experiment in Por-
tugal. This article analyzes the predictors of preferential vot-
ing in flexible list systems, focusing on political sophistication, 
voting rules and district size. It relies on a field experiment 
carried out in Portugal on the 2015 legislative election day. We 
found that the effect of district size depends on the nature of 
the voting rules introduced (optional or compulsory preferen-
tial voting). Also, political interest tends to lose its significance 
when preferential voting is compulsory. Thus, preferential vot-
ing does not constitute an obstacle for those with less political 
sophistication to express a vote, especially when the voting 
rules make preferential voting compulsory.
keywords: preferential voting; field experiment; electoral 
behavior; electoral system.
O que explica o voto preferencial? Estudo experimental nas 
eleições de 2015 em Portugal. O presente artigo analisa os 
fatores explicativos do voto preferencial em sistemas de lista 
flexível, com enfoque na sofisticação política, regras de votação 
e magnitude do círculo eleitoral. Baseia-se num estudo expe-
rimental de campo realizado em Portugal no dia das eleições 
legislativas de 2015. Verificou-se que o impacto da magnitude 
do círculo eleitoral depende das regras de votação utilizadas, 
que tornam o voto preferencial obrigatório ou opcional. Para 
além disso, o interesse pela política tende a perder a sua sig-
nificância estatística quando o voto preferencial é obrigatório. 
Portanto, o voto preferencial não constitui um obstáculo ao 
voto por parte dos cidadãos com menores níveis de sofistica-
ção política, especialmente quando as regras fazem com que a 
expressão de preferências seja obrigatória.
palavras-chave: voto preferencial; estudo experimental; 




What explains preferential voting?
A field experiment in Portugal
I N T RODU C T ION
There are substantial differences in the ballot structure of electoral systems 
among European countries and elsewhere (Ortega, 2004; Renwich and Pilet, 
2016), and research has shown that this may affect turnout, voting behavior, 
election results, quality of representation, and even satisfaction with democ-
racy (Shugart, 2001; Farrell and McAllister, 2006; Pereira and Andrade Silva, 
2009; Bosch and Orriols, 2014; Sanz, 2017; Söderlund, 2017; Riera and Bol, 
2017). However, even when ballot structure is considered, and its effects are 
tested, it is sometimes difficult to isolate that factor from other features of the 
electoral system or the broader context in which elections take place.
In this article we analyze how the likelihood of expressing preference votes is 
influenced by political sophistication, ballot structure, and district magnitude 
and how these last two variables interact with the levels of political sophisti-
cation of voters. We test these hypotheses using data collected during a field 
experiment carried out in the 2015 Portuguese legislative election day.1
The understanding on the contextual and individual factors of preferen-
tial voting is thin, and this article seeks to flesh it out. We also contribute to 
an ever-growing field of experimental and quasi-experimental analysis of the 
impact of electoral systems and, in particular, voting rules (Laslier and van der 
1 This study was conducted as part of the iaspp project “Infraestrutura das Atitudes Sociais e 
Políticas dos Portugueses” (Infrastructure of the Social and Political Attitudes of the Portuguese), 
funded by the Fundação Ciência e Tecnologia (fct, Foundation for Science and Technology). 
The authors would like to thank the fct for their support. The research was sponsored by the 
Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa (Institute of Social Sciences, University of 
Lisbon), in particular from the Observatório da Qualidade da Democracia (Center for the Quality 
of Democracy), and from the Thomas Jefferson – Correia da Serra Institute of Public Policy (ipp).
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Straeten, 2008; Blais et al., 2011, 2012; van der Straeten et al., 2013; Laslier et 
al., 2015; Baujard et al., 2014; Blumenau et al., 2017; Golder et al., 2017), which 
can provide empirically robust and internally valid insights about the nature 
and magnitude of that impact. We do this by reporting an experiment which 
consisted in a exit poll with different ballot papers. For our experiment, elec-
tors from three districts of different size were divided into three groups, and 
each group was presented with a different ballot: a closed-list ballot identical 
to the one used in the election; an ordered ballot on which the elector could 
either vote the party label or choose a single candidate; and an ordered ballot 
on which the candidate had to vote for one candidate.
This article is divided in the following five sections. First, the main studies 
that have investigated ballot structure and its consequences are briefly pre-
sented. Then we formulate our hypotheses concerning how the likelihood of 
expressing preferences vary according to different rules of flexible preferential 
voting, the size of electoral districts, the political sophistication of electors, 
and the interactions between these factors. In the third section, the method-
ology is described, i.e. the protocol implemented and the characteristics of the 
participants (citizens who had just exited the polling station and agreed to 
participate in an exit poll). Thereafter, the results of the statistical analysis test-
ing our hypotheses are presented and discussed. The paper ends with some 
considerations on the main implications of the empirical patterns observed 
via this experiment.
W H Y D O VOT E R S C AST PR E F E R E N T IA L BA L L OT S
I N F L E X I BL E L I ST SYST E M S ?
Most literature on preferential voting usually focuses on its incidence and 
effects (Marsh, 1985; Karvonen, 2004; Renwick and Pilet, 2016) while neglect-
ing its causes. However, aside from studying whether the effects of preferential 
voting are positive or negative in terms of how democracy works, we also need 
a systematic understanding of why people are more or less likely to express 
preferences for individual candidates (André and Depauw, 2017).
André et al. (2012) proposed three explanatory models of  preferential 
voting in flexible-list systems. The first, the resource model, sees preferential 
voting as a sophisticated voting behavior (see also Marsh, 1985). This is so 
because party labels provide shortcuts from which to infer issue positions 
and policy commitments as a whole, whereas differentiation between candi-
dates requires more time and effort. Therefore, in empirical terms, we should 
observe a positive relationship between expressions of preferences and direct 
or proxy measures of political sophistication, such as age, education, political 
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 knowledge, and political interest, as well as lower levels of preferential voting 
among women, the working class, and the unemployed (who are believed to 
display lower levels of political sophistication).
The second, entitled proximity model, posits that “a preference vote would 
be the sign of an intense and regular relation between voters and candidates 
they vote for” (André et al., 2012, p. 297). This means that empirical studies 
should find a positive relationship between expressing a preference vote and 
instances of direct (party or interest group membership, contact over casework, 
less densely populated contexts), or mediated contact (i. e. when party leaders 
or other elite members who benefit from wide media coverage are on the list).
Third, André et al. (2012) propose an instrumental model, which postulates 
that it is not rational for voters to express preferences when those preferences 
are highly unlikely to influence who is going to be elected. Thus, district mag-
nitude matters, since preferential votes become more decisive as the number of 
seats a party wins in an electoral district grows. We could therefore expect that 
preferential voting will be greater in districts of higher magnitude, where they 
are more likely to make a difference.
A test of the isolated and combined effects of these models in  Belgium 
(under an optional preferential voting system) gives support to the three 
models, even if only political interest and age are relevant resources (André 
et al., 2012). The resource model also receives support from other studies. 
For instance, focusing on four countries with very different systems in place 
( Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway), van der Kolk (2003) finds 
that education and political interest foster the expression of preferences, but 
reports mixed results regarding the role of party attachments, gender, and age. 
In turn, Andeweg and van Holsteyn (2011) find that women in the Nether-
lands tend to cast preferential votes more than men and that there is a negative 
association between age and preferential voting (with younger voters express-
ing preferences more often). These patterns are actually the opposite of what 
we would expect according to the resource model. However, the authors also 
find a positive impact of education, political interest, internal political efficacy, 
and political knowledge (which backs up an understanding of preferential vot-
ing as knowledgeable and sophisticated voting). A replication of their analy-
sis using data from the 2012 Dutch Election Study confirms the relevance of 
education (Hoedemakers, 2014). Lastly, a study focusing on six countries with 
open or flexible lists and optional preferential voting also shows that politi-
cal knowledge and education foster the expression of preferences, although 
the role of political sophistication is stronger in some contexts than in others 
(André and Depauw, 2017). In turn, the instrumental model receives support 
from a study that uses the existence and magnitude of thresholds required for 
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a candidate to be directly elected as a contextual condition, and shows that 
the effectiveness of the preference system (lower/no thresholds) leads to more 
preferential votes being cast (André and Depauw, 2017).
The three models discussed focus above all on individual characteristics 
of voters, but also recognize the importance of the context (the specificities of 
electoral designs) for preferential voting in flexible-list systems.
We argue that ballot structure is a relevant factor here. Whether voting 
for a candidate is optional or compulsory (in the sense that there is no formal 
way to simply express support for a party) is believed to be the most important 
difference between flexible list systems (Renwick and Pilet, 2016; Nagtzaam 
and van Erkel, 2017). Shugart (2005) even considers that flexible list systems 
in which the expression of preferences is made mandatory constitute a distinct 
sub-type, which he names latent list system.
In spite of their importance, few studies have analysed the direct impact 
of these rules on voting behavior. Renwick and Pilet (2016) compare countries 
where personalized voting is optional (Belgium, Czech Republic, and Sweden) 
and compulsory (the Netherlands), and conclude that there is no clear option-
al-versus-compulsory pattern. In fact, their direct and longitudinal comparison 
of the aggregate percentage of preferential votes between countries is incon-
clusive: whereas Belgians tend to vote more preferentially than the Dutch, the 
Czechs and Swedes do so to a lesser extent (André et al., 2012; Renwick and 
Pilet, 2016). Nevertheless, an experiment carried out in the Netherlands and 
Belgium by Nagtzaam and van Erkel (2017), which analyzed the impact of dif-
ferent arrangements (not only compulsory vs. optional voting rules in flexible 
lists, but also the number of preferences voters are allowed to express) concluded 
that if expressing preferences is optional, fewer preferential votes will be cast.
Beyond ballot structure, there are reasons to believe that district magnitude 
is a factor in preferential voting, namely by its impact in terms of both close-
ness between the candidates and the citizenry and party magnitude (André 
et al., 2012). However, these two arguments would lead to competing hypothe-
ses about the relationship between district magnitude and preferential voting. 
In the first case, a positive relationship would be expected: more preferential 
votes in low magnitude – and low population density – districts, because this 
will increase the proximity between candidates and voters and raise awareness of 
the individual MP candidates. In the second case, a negative relationship would 
be expected: small district magnitude would equate to low party magnitude 
(i. e. low number of winnable seats per party), which may discourage electors 
from voting preferentially (as well as demotivate candidates from adopting 
constituency-oriented stances and cultivating a personal reputation). André et 
al. (2012) report mixed evidence that supports both the relevance of proximity 
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and party magnitude in Belgium. There is also another reason why we could 
expect a negative association between district size and prevalence of preferen-
tial voting: the number of candidates may depress preferential voting, as elec-
tors feel overwhelmed by the amount of choices (André and Depauw, 2017).
Both ballot structure and district magnitude may not only affect the pro-
pensity to vote for specific candidates, but also interact with individual charac-
teristics associated with political sophistication. There are few studies on this 
topic, however. In a comparative study of six countries (Latvia and Switzer-
land, with open lists; Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Sweden, with 
flexible lists), André and Depauw (2017) conclude that the differences between 
the informed and the uninformed about politics are observable only in con-
texts in which there are fewer candidates (presumably in smaller districts); 
when this number is high, both groups display low odds of casting preferen-
tial votes. Research showing an interaction between voting rules and politi-
cal sophistication is, to our knowledge, nonexistent, but the latter may matter 
more in optional systems, since the logic underlying the impact of voting rules 
supports the assumption that list voting - unavailable in compulsory systems - 
is the easiest way out first and foremost for uninformed voters.
Based on this literature, and aiming to shed light on the relevance of dif-
ferent dimensions and contribute to the debates in this stream of research, we 
derive a set of hypotheses to be tested experimentally, which are presented in 
the next section.
G OA L S A N D H Y P OT H E SE S
Our goals are the following: to test the effect of different indicators of political 
sophistication on the expression of preferences, whether making preferential 
voting optional matters, the way in which district magnitude affects preferen-
tial voting, and how the last two variables interact with voters’ levels of political 
sophistication.
Our first hypothesis concerns political sophistication. We expect higher 
levels of education (which grants voters resources to better analyze political 
events and actors) and greater interest in politics to be predictors of preferen-
tial voting.
Hypothesis 1: Education and interest in politics have a positive impact on the likelihood of 
expressing preferences in the ballot.
Concerning the direct effect of voting rules, we argue that the lack of 
 formal alternatives to the preferential vote will lead to more voters casting 
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 preferential votes in compulsory systems than in optional ones. In order to 
compare non-preferential voting in compulsory and optional systems, we rely 
on the shared assumption that in compulsory systems voting for the list-puller 
(the first candidate on the list) as well as blank or invalid voting is non-prefer-
ential voting (Andeweg and van Holsteyn, 2011; Hoedemakers, 2014; Renwick 
and Pilet, 2016; but see also Nagtzaam and van Erkel, 2017 for an appraisal of 
this assumption). Therefore, we posit that:
Hypothesis 2: The expression of preferences for individual candidates is less common when 
voting rules make preferential voting optional instead of compulsory.
Regarding district magnitude, considering the previous studies, and due to 
contradictory evidence, we posit that:
Hypothesis 3: District magnitude is linked with different probabilities to express preferences 
on the ballot.
In addition to exploring the dynamics of political sophistication, voting 
rules and district magnitude, our aim is to see whether the context moderates 
the role of political sophistication in the likelihood of expressing preferences. 
We expect the role of political sophistication to be stronger in districts of high 
magnitude, in which the number of choices could be overwhelming for inat-
tentive voters (for instance, in Lisbon the number of candidates was above 700, 
whereas in Beja it was close to 50). Regarding the moderating impact of voting 
rules, we believe that political sophistication will matter more if the rules make 
preferential voting merely optional. In this case, uninterested electors will give 
their vote to the party list, and the politically engaged will be more likely to 
express a preference for a specific candidate. Therefore:
Hypothesis 4: The expression of preferences for individual candidates is more likely affected 
by voters’ levels of education and interest in politics in larger districts.
Hypothesis 5: Preferential voting is a function of political sophistication only when the sys-
tem does not make it mandatory.
DATA A N D M ET HOD S
We now report the experiment carried out and the methods employed in 
the analysis. Before doing so, in order to provide the reader with informa-
tion about the broad institutional setting in which the elections we focused 
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on took place, we describe the main characteristics of the Portuguese electoral 
and party system. Legislative elections in Portugal are held according to the 
D’Hondt formula in one-tier electoral systems with closed party lists. The 22 
districts in Portugal range from 2 to 48 seats (47 in 2015), thus making it one 
of the four countries with the greatest variation in district magnitude (Lago 
and Lobo, 2014). Concerning the party system, in the first democratic legisla-
tive elections (1975), four parties that still constitute the core of the Portuguese 
party system emerged (Lobo, 2001). These are the Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista, pcp) and Socialist Party ( Partido Socialista, ps) on the left, the 
center-right Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, psd), and the 
conservative Social Democratic Center (Centro Democrático Social, cds, today 
cds-pp), on the right. To these four parties, a fifth must be added, the Left 
Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, be), which since 1999 has consolidated its presence 
in Parliament, and can be ideologically placed on the extreme-left (Lisi, 2015). 
Portugal can be seen as a relatively stable and unfragmented party system: 
in 2011 and 2015 the number of effective parliamentary parties was, respec-
tively, 2.93 and 2.71 (Lobo, Pinto, and Magalhães, 2015).
the experiment
On 4 October 2015 (election day in Portugal), an exit poll field experiment 
with 936 voters took place. The experiment was conducted in three constituen-
cies: one large (Lisbon, which elected 47 deputies), one medium-sized (Braga, 
which elects 19 deputies), and one small (Beja, which elects 3 deputies). In 
each electoral district, 312 voters were randomly selected at several polling sta-
tions within each district (in eight different parishes, urban and rural, belong-
ing to four municipalities within the electoral district, which included the 
district capital and smaller towns).2 Voters were approached as they exited the 
2 In each electoral district, four councils were selected – in the circle of Beja: Beja, Castro 
Verde, Ferreira do Alentejo, and Moura; in Braga: Braga, Esposende, Fafe, and Guimarães; in 
Lisbon: Cadaval, Lisbon, Sintra, and Vila Franca de Xira. In each of these councils two parishes 
were selected, thus totalling eight parishes per electoral district (See Table a1 in the Appendix). 
Eight interviewers were involved and each interviewed circa 40 respondents over nine hours 
on election day. The response rate was 86%. Each interviewer carried 13/14 ballots of each of 
the three possible types. The interviewers were monitored on site at every stage of the process, 
namely in terms of selection of the respondent, the way the interviewer approached the respon-
dent and presented the study, and the duration of interview. During the day, the characteristics of 
respondents (age and gender) were recorded to ensure that at the end of the day, the three effec-
tive samples were equivalent regarding the main socio-demographic variables (age and gender). 
In order to ensure that, when considered separately, these three samples would be representative 
of electors in each electoral district, a socio-demographic matrix for each district derived from 
the National Census was used as reference. This matrix is presented in Table a2 in Appendix 1.
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polling station and randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions 
(104 participants per condition in each district): they were either invited to 
“vote” using the official ballot used in the 2015 legislative election (the control 
group), a ballot offering the possibility to vote for either a party or a candidate 
(the optional preference voting condition), or a ballot only allowing voting for 
a candidate (the compulsory preference voting condition). For the purposes of 
this paper, we use only the data gathered in these last two experimental condi-
tions; therefore, the number of cases in this study is 624.
Participants in the compulsory and optional preferential voting conditions 
received a ballot with the party lists of each of the 15 or 16 parties running in 
the district. The number of candidates in each party list matched the number 
of seats at stake in each constituency. This ballot is different from that com-
monly used in Portugal, which merely presents the names and symbols of the 
political parties. The lists were headed by the name and symbol of the political 
party, and the order of the candidates on the list was the one decided by the 
parties; that is, voters were asked to express preferences on actual mp candi-
dates by looking at their names ordered in the way their parties decided to 
place them. The ballots were a3 sheets of paper, with a landscape layout, and 
the lists occupied one side of this sheet in the case of Beja and Braga and two 
sides in the case of Lisbon. The layout was not very different from that used 
in Dutch general elections. The only difference between the ballots used in 
the optional and compulsory conditions was that in the former there was also 
a check-box next to the name and symbol of each party, which participants 
could use if they preferred to support the party as a whole.
The ballots were accompanied by instructions. In the compulsory con-
dition, the instructions were: “This ballot has a different than usual format. 
Please read the following instructions carefully before casting your vote! Please 
vote by placing an x next to the name of your preferred candidate. The lists 
included here are the lists of candidates standing for election for each party 
in this constituency. With this ballot paper you can vote for your preferred 
candidate by placing a cross (x) in the space next to the candidate’s name. You 
can only express one vote, by placing one cross (x) next to your preferred can-
didate. If you make more than one cross (x) your vote will be spoiled.” Partici-
pants in the optional condition were given very similar instructions, different 
only in key aspects (in italics): “This ballot has a different than usual format. 
Please read the following instructions carefully before casting your vote! Please 
vote by placing an x next to the name of your preferred party or candidate. 
With this ballot paper you can vote either for your preferred party (by placing 
a cross (x) in the box next to the party symbol), or for your preferred candidate 
(by placing a cross (x) in the space next to the candidate’s name). The lists 
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included here are the lists of parties and candidates standing for election in this 
constituency. You can only express one vote, by placing one cross (x) next to 
either your preferred party or your preferred candidate. If you make more than 
one cross (x) your vote will be spoiled.”
After casting their ballots, the participants were asked to fill in a short 
questionnaire, aimed at getting information about their socio-demographic 
characteristics (gender, age, education, marital status, professional status, 
religiosity, union membership, and political party/group membership)3, key 
political attitudes (political interest, ideology)4 and preferred modes of expo-
sure to political information5. The information about political characteristics 
was asked for separately from the ballot, in order to give respondents freedom 
to vote. No information on how votes would be translated into seats was given; 
voters therefore behaved under the assumption that the electoral formula 
would not be changed.
The compulsory preferential rule we adopt in this experiment is very simi-
lar to that of the Netherlands. Interestingly enough, the Dutch system does not 
exacerbate the incentives for candidates to cultivate personal votes, since the 
parties still present and order the ballots (which may, of course, be altered by 
voters), votes are pooled, and voters cast only one single vote below the party 
level. Therefore, it is similar to the Portuguese system regarding incentives to 
cultivate personal votes: the Netherlands ranks ninth within the 13 combi-
nations of systemic incentives to pursue personal votes (Carey and Shugart, 
1995; Andeweg and van Holsteyn, 2011). The optional system we test here is 
very similar to the Belgian, with the main difference being the fact that in our 
experiment voters were allowed either to simply endorse a party list or select 
a single candidate (in Belgium voters may vote for the party or express prefer-
ences for one or several candidates; André et al., 2012).
3 Gender is a dummy variable in which 1 stands for “male”. Age is a continuous variable mea-
suring the age of participants on election day. Education is an ordinal variable with 7 points, 
ranging from 1 (no schooling) to 7 (university degree completed). Marital status is a nominal 
variable differentiating between those who were married or cohabiting, widowed, divorced/sepa-
rated, or single on election day. Professional status is also a nominal variable distinguishing those 
with a full-time job, a part-time job, home-makers, students, retired, or in “other situation”. Reli-
giosity is measured here via a 4-point scale in which 1 stands for “not religious at all” and 4 means 
“very religious”. Lastly, both union and political party/group membership are dummy variables, 
in which 1 means that the participant is unionized or a political party or group member.
4 Political interest is measured via a 4-point scale in which 1 means “not interested at all” and 
4 means “very interested”. Ideology is measured through an 11-point scale in which 0 stands for 
“left” and 10 for “right”. The mid-point of this scale is 5.
5 A nominal variable distinguishing those who favor television, newspapers, radio, social 
networks such as Facebook and Twitter, or none of these media.
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participants
As mentioned above, 936 voters in the 2015 Portuguese legislative elections 
participated in this experiment, and the data on 624 of them (those who were 
allocated to either the compulsory or the optional preference voting condi-
tions) are used in the analysis.
This group is composed of 51.4% women, and the mean age of partici-
pants is 49 (with a standard deviation of 17; 23% between 18 and 34 years old 
and 20% older than 65). Participants were also diverse in terms of educational 
profile, with 21.3% holding a university degree and 18.3% having completed 
only elementary schooling. The majority of participants rely on television for 
information on politics or current affairs (70.4%), and 36.1% claim to be not 
religious at all or not very religious. The sample is almost evenly composed 
of full-time employees (52.3%) and people with other professional situations. 
Only 7.4% are union members, and 11.4% claim to be part of political par-
ties or groups. Self-reported levels of political interest are, on average, above 
the mid-point of the scale (2.7, with a standard deviation of .9), which is not 
surprising considering that participants are actual voters (people who turned 
out to vote on a sunny Sunday), but, even so, 11% declared to be uninterested 
in politics and 27% just a bit interested. In terms of ideology, the average is of 
4.79 (with a standard deviation of 2.5) on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). 
Comparing the official election results in the three constituencies and the 
choices made by the respondents using the official ballot paper in the October 
2015 election confirms, grosso modo, the representative nature of the sample in 
terms of party choice (Lobo, Santana-Pereira and Gaspar, 2015).
Taken as a whole, the groups of participants in the two main experimental 
conditions (optional vs. compulsory) are equivalent.6 However, due to the dif-
ferent characteristics of the Lisbon, Braga, and Beja areas, the groups of partic-
ipants in the three districts differ in terms of educational attainment (being, on 
average, more educated in Lisbon than in Beja; f (2,623) = 4.564; p < .05), reli-
giosity (being more religious in Braga than in Beja, and more religious in Beja 
than in Lisbon; f (2,623) = 16.120; p < .001), political party or group member-
ship (more common in Lisbon than elsewhere; f (2,623) = 5.094; p < .01), and 
6 There are no statistically significant differences in terms of gender (t (622) = -1.201; p > .05), 
age (t (622 = .026; p > .05), educational attainment (t (622) = -.499; p > .05), interest in politics 
(t (622) = -.819; p > .05), religiosity (t (622) = -.041; p > .05), ideology (t (617) = -.364; p > .05), 
marital status (χ2 = 3.118; p > .05), preferred media for political information (χ2 = 3.753; p > .05), 
employment status (χ2 = 9.738; p > .05), union membership (t (622) = -.612; p > .05), or party/
political group membership (t (622) = -.1268; p > .05).
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ideology (with participants in Braga being, on average, more right-wing than 
those of Lisbon and Beja; f (2,618) = 12.448; p < .001). Therefore, in the data 
analysis reported in the following section, these variables will be controlled for 
via their insertion in regression models.
Table 1 presents the frequency of preferential voting across districts, 
comparing both optional and compulsory ballots. In the optional preferen-
tial voting condition, the percentage expresses the proportion of participants 
who voted for a given candidate instead of for the party as a whole, blank, 
or null. Instead, in the compulsory preferential voting condition, we present 
the proportion of voters expressing preferences for candidates other than the 
list-puller (as we have seen above, voting for the first candidate in the list is 
often assumed to be a sign of non-preferential voting; this is, therefore, a very 
conservative measure of preferential voting, since list-pulling votes may some-
times be sincere preferential votes).
A note on spoiled ballots is due. Unsurprisingly, the percentage of spoiled 
votes is higher in these two experimental conditions (about 13%) than when 
the participants used the official ballot (5% approximately; Lobo, Santana- 
-Pereira and Gaspar, 2015).7
7 A regression analysis testing the same model displayed in Table 2, but having the proba-
bility of casting a blank or null vote as dependent variable, shows that interest in politics and 
education do not affect the probability of spoiling a vote, which was higher for the participants 
in the compulsory preferential voting condition and as the magnitude of the electoral district 
increased; both variables interacted, with the effect of district magnitude on the likelihood of 
spoiling votes being much stronger in the compulsory than in the optional condition.
TABLE 1
Percentage of Preferential Votes Cast by District and Condition







Preferences (vote for candidates) 12.5 9.6 26.9
Vote for the List 82.7 78.4 55.8






y Preferences (vote for candidates other than the list-puller) 23.1 51.9 17.3
Vote for the list-puller 63.4 26.9 75.1
Blank/Null 13.5 21.2 7.6
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R E SU LT S
In order to test our hypotheses, we computed logistic regression models on the 
likelihood of casting a preference vote, having as predictors district magnitude 
(a three-point variable)8, the ballot structure (a dummy variable), gender, age, 
education, and political interest. We also inserted religiosity, union member-
ship, and political party/group membership (as proxies or actual measures of 
involvement in associative work; see André et al., 2016) and ideology as con-
trols.9
The results, shown in Table 2 (Model 1), reveal that most  individual level 
variables are not key predictors of the likelihood of casting a preferential vote. 
Other than ideology10, there is an effect of political interest, with those who 
are not interested in politics at all being less likely to vote for individual can-
didates that those who self-report higher levels of interest about what happens 
in the world of politics. Education seems to have no impact on the likelihood 
to vote for individual candidates. The results also show that the effect of polit-
ical interest is modest: when the other variables are kept at their mean values, 
the uninterested are 28% likely to express preferences, in contrast with those 
who are very interested in politics: 38%. Gender and age do not seem to have 
an impact on the likelihood to express preferences in the ballot: men are just 
slightly more likely to do it than women (predicted probabilities of 31 and 
26%, respectively), and there is no distinct pattern in terms of age. In short, we 
find partial and modest empirical support for hypothesis 1.
8 The three points are low magnitude (Beja), average magnitude (Braga) and very high 
magnitude (Lisbon). We understand this three-point variable as ordinal, since an increase 
in this variable is related to an increase (or decrease) in the factors that encourage or inhibit 
preferential voting discussed above (proximity, media visibility of candidates, etc.), although 
this increase/decrease may not be constant from point to point. Use of ordinal variables as 
continuous is standard, leading to greater interpretability of results (vis-à-vis the use of several 
dummies).
9 The evidence regarding the role of ideology is, however, both scarce and mixed. 
 Hoedemakers (2014) reports a small but significant effect of ideology, with left-wing voters 
being more likely to select candidates other than the list-puller. While weak, this result is inter-
esting because it neither corroborates the irrelevance of ideology in terms of the level on which 
one allocates one’s vote (Andeweg and van Holsteyn, 2011) nor literature hypothesizing higher 
levels of preferential voting from right-wing voters, associated with a trend for candidates linked 
to right-wing parties to undertake more personalized campaigns than left-wing candidates (e. g. 
Giebler and Wessels, 2013, Karlsen and Skogerbø, 2015).
10 We computed predicted probabilities of preferential voting of 10.1% for the extreme left-
wing voters, 21% for those placed at the center of the spectrum, and 30% for the extreme right-
wing participants.
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The regression reported in Table 2, Model 1, also allows us to test hypoth-
eses 2 and 3 regarding the effects of voting rules and district magnitude. Con-
cerning the former, its impact is significant and follows the expected direction: 
on average, participants in the optional condition were only 22% likely to 
express preferences, as compared to 35% in the compulsory condition (keep-
ing all the other variables constant). That is, regardless of the broader context 
and voter characteristics, compulsory preference voting rules (i. e. the lack of a 
formal possibility of not voting for individual candidates) does produce more 
actual preferential votes being cast, when compared to optional preferential 
voting.11 Therefore, hypothesis 2 is confirmed.
Nevertheless, the coefficient for district magnitude does not reach statisti-
cal  significance, which would cause Hypothesis 3 to be rejected. The predicted 
probabilities actually point to the fact that preferential voting could be more 
likely in a district of relatively average magnitude such as Braga (32%) than 
in low and high magnitude districts (26/27%). We decided to further explore 
the role of district magnitude and see if its effect depends on the voting rules 
used in this field experiment, by adding an interaction term of these variables 
to the regression model. The effect turns out to be statistically significant 
(Table 2, Model 2).
The predicted probabilities (Figure 1) shed light on the interaction between 
these two variables: it seems that the relationship between district size and 
probability to cast preferential votes is U-shaped when the voting rules make 
the expression of preferences merely optional. In this case, the likelihood of 
expressing preferences is greater in low (20.0%) and high (29.6%) magnitude 
districts than in the intermediate one (9.7%). In fact, these results can be read 
in light of what André, Waulters, and Pilet (2016) report in their study of pref-
erential voting in Belgium, where an optional system is in place. On the one 
hand, in contexts such as Beja, in which the population density is low, the 
proximity model would posit somewhat higher patterns of preferential  voting 
than in more densely populated contexts such as Braga or Lisbon. But in Lis-
bon this sense of proximity is fostered by the media: while it is unlikely in 
such a densely populated setting to meet the candidates in person, several 
 candidates running in Lisbon are party leaders or key party elite members, 
11  A t-test, performed under the assumption that the groups of participants in the optional 
and mandatory conditions are equivalent, supports the conclusions of the analysis of predicted 
probabilities holding the other variables constant, but finds a slightly stronger impact of this 
factor: on average, 16.4% of the participants in the optional conditions voted for a specific can-
didate, while in the compulsory conditions taken as a whole this value is almost twice as great 
(30.7%; differences are statistically significant: t(622)= -4.301; p < .001).
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TABLE 2
Parameter estimates for the predictors of the probability of expressing preferences in 
the ballots (logistic regressions)














































































































Nagelkerke R2 .135 .152 .143 .140
N 619 619 619 619
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy in which the value 1 identifies the participants who expressed pref-
erences in the ballot. Values are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Significance: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.
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benefiting from media attention that is usually not granted to candidates run-
ning in other districts, such as Braga.
However, the probability of casting preferential votes reveals an inverted 
u shape when the voting rules are compulsory (Figure 1). In this context, 
the likelihood of expressing preferences is greater in Braga (51.4%) than in 
Lisbon (21.2%) or Beja (28.3%). In Beja, this figure may be explained by the 
instrumental model rationale: voting for candidates other than the list-puller 
(our measure of preferential voting) may not make much sense in a context in 
which most parties will, if lucky, have a party magnitude of 1, i. e., elect just one 
mp, and, therefore, the most feasible candidate is likely to be the list-puller. In 
turn, in Lisbon, most list-pullers are party leaders, which means that the like-
lihood of voting for candidates other than them may be hindered by a trend 
toward first-level personalized voting. That is, voters may think that “if I have 
no alternative but vote for a candidate, I might as well just vote for the leader 
of my party”.
A second interesting finding from the data shown in Figure 1 is that it 
seems that voting rules only make a difference when the number of seats at 
stake is neither very low (Beja) nor very high (Lisbon), but just above average 
(Braga).
Given the fact that political interest is the only measure of sophistication 
with an impact on the likelihood to vote preferentially, our analysis is herein-
after focused on the interaction of political interest with both voting rules and 
district magnitude, in order to test hypotheses 4 and 5.12 Models 3 and 4 in 
Table 2 present the results of two regression models in which these interaction 
terms were included. The interaction between political interest and district 
magnitude is highly insignificant, thus discouraging Hypothesis 4 (Model 3), 
while the interaction term with voting rules is not statistically significant with 
a confidence interval of 95%, but significant if an interval of 94.5% would be 
chosen, which leads us to analyze it in greater depth in order to test Hypoth-
esis 5. This interaction is further explored in Figure 2, which plots predicted 
12 For the sake of completeness, we also computed models with interaction terms between, 
on the one hand, voting rules or district magnitude, and, on the other, alternative indicators of 
political sophistication (gender, age, education), to rule out the possibility that the absence of 
main effects of those variables was due to their impact being diametrically opposite in different 
contexts and, therefore, evened out when the context is not accounted for by means of interac-
tion terms. None of the interaction terms between voting rules and gender, age, or education 
were statistically significant. In the case of the interactions between district magnitude, and 
these variables, only the term regarding gender was significant: women are slightly more likely 
than men to cast preferential votes in the low magnitude district of Beja but less likely to do so 
in the two other districts.














Predicted probability of preferential voting according to voting rules and district 
magnitude (with confidence intervals in dotted lines)
FIGURE 2
Predicted probability of preferential voting according to voting rules and levels of 
interest in politics (with confidence intervals in dotted lines)











probabilities of preferential voting according to levels of interest in politics and 
the voting rules underlying the ballot used to cast the vote, controlling for the 
other factors. What we see is that a positive (but modest) association between 
levels of political interest and preferential voting is observed only when the 
rules make the expression of preferences optional: in this context, voters are 
more likely to vote for individual candidates if they are more interested in what 
happens in the realm of politics. However, political interest does not seem to 
be a key feature of preferential voting when there is no formal alternative to 
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casting a vote for a candidate. Regardless of their political awareness, partici-
pants in this condition were equally likely to vote for candidates other than the 
list-puller. While vote rules seem not to matter in terms of probability to cast 
preferential votes for those who are very interested in politics, in the case of 
the uninterested the fact that there is a formal way of voting without having to 
choose among candidates tends to lower (although not in a statistically signif-
icant way) their odds of expressing preferences. In short, Hypothesis 5 seems 
to receive empirical support from this analysis.
C ONC LU SION S
In this article, the results of an experiment carried out in the 2015 legislative 
elections in Portugal are used to further our understanding of flexible list vot-
ing. The experimental study – focusing on actual voters on election day – is an 
ideal ground to test our hypotheses, and enables the study of the impact of the 
varying electoral system characteristics on voting behavior, holding everything 
else constant, which is very rare in published studies of preferential voting.
Studying these issues will help us to understand the conditions under 
which preferential voting can be a mechanism that furthers choice by the 
electorate. Given this overall goal, the focus was on testing the importance of 
political sophistication for preferential voting, as well as contextual dimen-
sions such as district magnitude and voting rules (compulsory or optional 
preferential voting). We also explored whether political sophistication matters 
for the expression of preferences in interaction with voting rules and amount 
of choices available.
The analysis shows that age, gender, and education make no difference for 
casting a preferential vote, which is encouraging from the perspective of its 
introduction. Only political interest emerges as a significant predictor of pref-
erence voting in our multivariate model. Concerning the two different voting 
rules, optional and compulsory preferences, having the latter makes a signif-
icant difference. District magnitude does not seem to make a difference, but 
further exploration of the interaction of this variable in interaction with type 
of ballot employed shows that it is significant. The relationship between this 
variable and the expression of preference votes follows a u-shaped curve for 
voters using optional voting, but an n-shaped curve for voters using compul-
sory voting. Indeed, it is the mid-size district – Braga – where voting rules 
make a difference, with a substantial increase in the number of voters express-
ing a preference vote when the ballot makes preferential voting compulsory.
Finally, the analysis of the interaction between political interest and the 
two contextual variables does not show significance. If we loosen the  criteria 
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of significance slightly we see that there is a positive (but modest) association 
between levels of political interest and preferential voting in the optional pref-
erential voting context, while political interest seems to make no difference if 
preference voting is compulsory.
Taken together, these results suggest that preferential voting is not depen-
dent on political sophistication, with the partial exception of political inter-
est. District magnitude does not seem to matter much for the likelihood of 
expressing preferences, especially when one compares very small and very 
large constituencies, whose characteristics allow for the resources and incen-
tives listed by André et al. (2012) to work. In average size districts, the likeli-
hood of expressing preferences may be greater or less than in the other districts 
according to the voting rules, with compulsory vote increasing the number of 
preferential votes and optional vote depressing it. The compulsory ballot is sig-
nificantly linked to preferential voting (especially so in average-size districts) 
and also dilutes the importance that political interest may have in determining 
preferential voting. The results therefore do not suggest that preferential voting 
discriminates against those who are less sophisticated, especially if the ballot 
presented is one of compulsory preferential voting. Ceteris paribus, it makes a 
significant case for the adoption of compulsory voting, such as in the Nether-
lands, rather than the optional system, such as in Belgium.
Before ending, we would like to acknowledge some of the paper’s short-
comings that may signal avenues for future research. First, it would have been 
important to include more electoral districts of similar magnitude, so that we 
consolidate our findings for district effects. Second, it would have also been 
interesting to compare systematically with another country where preferential 
voting already occurs. We are aware that having this kind of study in a country 
without preferential voting means that electors had not previously prepared 
to vote on such terms and were conscious that this was simply a study. Third, 
despite the fact that the response rate was 86% in the exit poll, there is still the 
possibility it may have resulted in bias due to the risk of polling only those 
voters most willing to respond. Last, a larger questionnaire would enable us to 
elicit more information about our respondents and the reasons for the type of 
preferential vote they cast.
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A PPE N DI X
TABLE A1








União das freguesias de Beja
(Santiago Maior e São João Baptista)
11887
Beja
União das freguesias de Beja
(Salvador e Santa Maria da Feira)
8794
Castro Verde Santa Bárbara de Padrões 881
Castro Verde União das freguesias de Castro Verde e Casével 4590
Ferreira do Alentejo União das freguesias de Alfundão e Peroguarda 1041
Ferreira do Alentejo União das freguesias de Ferreira do Alentejo e Canhestros 4330
Moura
União das freguesias de Moura (Santo Agostinho
e São João Baptista) e Santo Amador
7607
Moura




Braga Braga (São Vítor) 24394
Braga União das freguesias de Celeirós, Aveleda e Vimieiro 5972
Esposende Antas 2179
Esposende  União das freguesias de Esposende, Marinhas e Gandra 11005
Fafe Arões (São Romão) 3239
Fafe União de freguesias de Moreira do Rei e Várzea Cova 2318
Guimarães Creixomil 8638
Guimarães Selho (São Jorge) 5182
Lisbon
Cadaval União das freguesias do Cadaval e Pêro Moniz 3140
Cadaval União das freguesias de Lamas e Cercal 3238
Lisbon Lumiar 37856
Lisbon Penha de França 25501
Sintra Rio de Mouro 37850
Sintra Colares 6387
VF Xira Vila Franca de Xira 15509
VF Xira União das freguesias de Alverca do Ribatejo e Sobralinho 28950
Source: CNE
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TABLE A2
Socio-Demographic Matrix for each Electoral District
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